November 2, 2006

Department of Defense
Office of Inspector General

Quality

Integrity

Accountability

Additional Copies

To obtain additional copies of this report, visit the Web site of the Department of Defense Inspector General at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports or contact the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax (703) 604-8932.

Suggestions for Future Audits

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing at (703) 604-8940 (DSN 664-8940) or fax (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

ODIG-AUD (ATTN: Audit Suggestions)
Department of Defense Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

To report fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse of authority.

Send written complaints to: Defense Hotline. The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301 -1900
Phone: 800.h24.9098 e-mail: hotline@dodig.mil www.dodig.mil/hotline

Acronyms

ARDEC Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center
ARFORGEN Army Force Generation
ARNG Army National Guard
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
EPT Integrated Product Team
JSSAP Joint Service Small Arms Program
MEEL Mission Essential Equipment List
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
PEO Program Executive Office
SWAT Soldier Weapons Assessment Team
TACOM U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

November 2, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ACQUISITION,
LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS (G-3)
ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PROGRAMS (G-8)

SUBJECT: Report on the Army Small Arms Program That Relates to Availability, Maintainability, and Reliability of Small Arms Support for the Warfighter (Report No. D-2007-010)

We are providing this report for information and use. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report.

Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. As a result of management comments, we revised recommendation A.1. Therefore, no additional comments are required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Mr. Timothy A. Wimette at (703) 604-8876 (DSN 664-8876) or Mr. Douglas P. Ickes at (703) 604-8763 (DSN 664-8763). For the report distribution, see Appendix G. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

By direction of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing:

Robert Prinzbach II
for:
Wanda A. Scott
Assistant Inspector General
Readiness and Operations Support Directorate

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D2007-010
(Project No. D2005-D000LH-0232)

November 2, 2006

The Army Small Arms Program That Relates to Availability, Maintainability,
and Reliability of the Small Arms Support for the Warfighter

Executive Summary

Who Should Read This Report and Why? DoD civilian and military personnel responsible for the availability, maintainability, and reliability of small arms for warfighters should read this report. The report not only identifies potential small arms availability issues of nondeployed units but also explains actions the Army took for maintainability and reliability of small arms.

Results. The Army equipped its deployed forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the small arms necessary to meet Combatant Commanders requirements. However, before deployment, some units were not fully equipped with the types of small arms required to do their assigned mission and obtained those small arms from other sources, such as nondeployed units. Nondeployed units face a potential shortage of small arms and may not have the ability to adequately train and maintain equipment and personnel readiness at an acceptable level. Implementing and monitoring the Army Force Generation Program will ensure that the unit's readiness is not degraded. Outlining requirements and developing a plan for small arms distribution will avert future small arms shortages. (See Finding A for the detailed recommendations.)

The Army generally had adequate controls for maintainability and reliability of small arms fielded to the warfighter. As a result of the Army's proactive approach to maintenance and reliability, the warfighter is provided with reliable small arms capabilities to sustain operations in varying environments. Following up on findings and recommendations made by the Soldier Weapons Assessment Team will address small arms maintainability risks identified. (See Finding B for detailed recommendations.)

Management Comments and Audit Response. The Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization nonconcurred with the draft recommendation. However, ongoing initiatives and management actions were responsive to the initial findings. We agree with the actions the Army took. The Deputy Director, Forces Development did not concur or nonconcur with the recommendation. Although they did not concur or nonconcur, we believe the management actions meet the intent of the recommendation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) concurred with the recommendation. See the Finding section of the report for a discussion of management comments on the recommendations and our audit response. See the Management Comments section of the report for the complete text of the comments.

i

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ----------------------------------------------------------- i

Background ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1

Objectives ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2

Management Control Program --------------------------------------------- 2

Findings
A. Equipping the Force ------------------------------------------------------ 3

B. Maintainability and Reliability of Small Arms -------------------- 8

Appendixes

A. Scope and Methodology ------------------------------------------------ 12
B. Prior Coverage -------------------------------------------------------------- 14
C. Weapon Systems ----------------------------------------------------------15
D. U.S. Small Arms ----------------------------------------------------------- 16
E. Army Organizations Reviewed ---------------------------------------- 17
F. Small Arms Support Center ---------------------------------------------18
G. Report Distribution --------------------------------------------------------- 19

Management Comments

Assistant Secretary of the Army Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology ---- 21
Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) ------------- 22
Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-8) --------------- 24

Background

Small Arms. Small arms are weapon systems that individuals or crews can easily transport or that can be mounted on a platform. DoD defines small arms as "manportable and platform mounted individual and crew served weapons systems used against protected and unprotected personnel and light or unarmored vehicles." See Appendixes C and D for a list of the 33 small arms DoD uses. DoD estimates that of the 33 weapons in service, 14 (including the 6 we reviewed) will remain in active force through 2020.

Joint Service Small Arms Program. In 1978, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense designated the Army as the Executive Agent for the Joint Service Small Arms Program (JSSAP). JSSAP coordinates and harmonizes new Service materiel requirements that have the potential for joint application and keeps abreast of each Service's efforts to improve life-cycle management. In 2002 the responsibility for life-cycle management passed to Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed that the Secretaries of the Military Departments, coordinated by the Secretary of the Army, jointly develop a Small Arms Master Plan. Through the JSSAP Management Committee, the Services developed and endorsed the Joint Service Small Arms Master Plan. The JSSAP Management Committee comprises representatives from each Military Department, the Coast Guard, Special Operations Command, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, and Project Manager Soldier Weapons.

The Master Plan represents a balanced strategy aimed at fulfilling user requirements by developing, demonstrating, producing, and fielding in a timely manner the most capable and cost-effective small arms systems for our forces. However, during our audit we found the responsibilities of the JSSAP evolved toward research, development, test, and evaluation for future weapon initiatives.

As a result of the Army's restructuring of management oversight of small arms, we focused our audit effort to evaluate the initiatives of PEO Soldier to support and sustain the warfighter in the current operating environment.

Program Executive Office Soldier. The mission of PEO Soldier is arm and equip soldiers to dominate the full spectrum of peace and war now and in the future. The Army created PEO Soldier with one purpose: develop the best equipment and field that equipment as quickly as possible so our soldiers remain second to none. Reporting to PEO Soldier is Project Manager Soldier Weapons, which ensures that soldiers have weapon capabilities they need by developing, producing, and procuring weapon systems, ammunition, and associated target acquisition and fire control products.

Product Managers for both Individual Weapons and Crew Served Weapons organizationally report to Project Manager Soldier Weapons. Product Manager Individual Weapons manages and researches development of rifles, carbines, pistols, shotguns, grenade launchers, small arms ammunition, and related target acquisition and fire control products for the Army and the other Military Departments. Product Manager Crew Served Weapons develops and manages light to heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, sniper systems, research and

1

development of small arms ammunition, and related fire control and acquisition products for the Army and the other Military Departments.

Objectives

The overall objective was to evaluate the initiatives of JSSAP to support and sustain the warfighter in the current operating environment. Specifically, we determined the availability of small arms for meeting requirements as well as whether adequate control measures were in place that would ensure maintainability and reliability of fielded small arms. We also reviewed the management controls related to the audit objective. See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and Appendix B for prior coverage related to the audit objectives.

Management Control Program

We did not identify one overall Management Control Program (MCP) for JSSAP. Each Army organization has its own program and specific internal control mechanisms pertaining to small arms. We did not assess the individual internal control programs because of time constraints and the complexity of this work. However, during our review we tested some of the key controls applicable to availability, maintainability, and reliability of small arms. Generally, management controls were in place and working effectively; however, we identified a few control issues requiring management attention. Those control issues are described in our findings and recommendations sections in this report and address actions to improve the control issues.

2

A. Equipping the Force

The Army equipped its deployed forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the small arms necessary to meet Combatant Commanders requirements. However, before deployment, some units were not fully equipped with the types of small arms required to do their assigned mission and obtained those small arms from other sources, such as nondeployed units. This happened because the current mission requirements warrant different types of small arms not reflected in a unit's Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). As a result, nondeployed units face a potential shortage of small arms and may not have the ability to adequately train and maintain equipment and personnel readiness at an acceptable level.

Equipment Background

The National Military Strategy provides the basis for how the Army will train, equip, and fight. Based on the strategy, the Army Force Development Office brings together people and equipment and creates operational organizations with the capabilities the Combatant Commander requires. To support that mission, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) publishes what the Army calls a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

An MTOE is a document that prescribes the structure and equipment for military units. The document includes information on the mission of the unit, number of soldiers, and weapons authorized for the unit. MTOE requirements are considered when establishing the minimum amount of mission-essential equipment a unit requires for executing its primary mission or wartime tasks.

When a unit is assigned a mission different from its MTOE, units may need to supplement weapons listed on their MTOE. If that occurs, the unit can determine if a Mission Essential Equipment List (MEEL) is available for their location and type of mission. The MEEL is a pre-certified listing of equipment required for a specific mission at a specific location. If a MEEL for that mission does not exist, the unit must request the additional or different weapons by writing an Operational Needs Statement. A needs statement certifies the need for the additional or different weapons.

Equipping the Force

The Army equipped its deployed forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the small arms necessary to meet Combatant Commander requirements. However, before deployment, some units were not fully equipped with the types of small arms required to do their assigned mission and obtained those small arms from other sources, such as nondeployed units. Gaps in supplying units with small arms existed because units mobilized either under their MTOE or according to an operational need and requirements dictate which small arms provide the necessary fire power for combating a threat.

Of the 15 Army Active and Reserve Component units we reviewed supporting

3

operations In Iraq, 12 had the necessary small arms before deployment and 3 had the necessary small arms once they arrived in the theater.

Cross leveling. Cross leveling is a process the Services use to move small arms from one military unit to meet the higher priority of another unit. Of the 15 units we interviewed, 7 units cross leveled from within their command structure. For example, personnel within one Army National Guard (ARNG) unit identified concerns at the organizational level for the nondeployed company (Charlie Company) within their battalion that was tasked to provide small arms, specifically M4s, to their two deploying companies (Alpha and Bravo Companies) 1. The cross leveling of the small arms from Charlie Company to Alpha and Bravo Companies was not optional at the organizational level. Subsequently, Charlie Company was identified for mobilization and anticipates that the weapons will be returned in ample time to reconstitute the inventory for the deployment. However, the lack of the M4s could have a significant effect on the ability of Charlie Company to train and prepare for deployment.

The ARNG took preliminary steps to ensure that units providing equipment, also referred to as donor units, to deploying units limit the potential degradation through cross leveling activities. The ARNG included a statement in deployment orders that cross leveling can not cause a donor unit to drop below a level three (one being the highest and five being the lowest) for Unit Status Reporting levels. This is clear recognition of a potential problem and can be viewed as a management control tool that the ARNG uses to mitigate risk for the non- deploying units.

Army Equipment Loan Lease Program. U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) operates a loan program in which units may obtain weapons when cross leveling is not an available option. TACOM works closely with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-8) and other organizations to make weapons available for units when necessary. TACOM also controls acquisition of new small arms and works with the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama for overhauled weapons as part of the sustainment of small arms. In meetings with the U.S. Army Reserve Command, officials stated they were unaware of such a program. Of the 15 units we interviewed, only 1 received weapons from the equipment loan lease program. Personnel stated they struggle to keep up with the demand for weapons. However, command officials stated that no matter the shortage, deployed soldiers have top priority and receive a weapon.

Mission Requirements for Small Arms

Mission requirements can warrant different types of small arms not reflected in a unit's MTOE. This occurs because the process for building an MTOE has not kept pace with the rapidly changing operational environment. Missions related to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have dictated how the Army adapts to the current situation with a more streamlined approach to supplying the forces and those adhoc units required in theater. In addition, doctrinal requirements have lagged between the Cold War mission resources and the need for a transforming

1. For explanation purposes, we refer to the companies within the unit using the alias of Alpha, Bravo, Charlie.

4

Army requiring a balanced distribution based on the changing GWOT threat.

The Army is undergoing one of its greatest transitions in years. It is transforming its Cold War era, heavy-division structure into a more mobile, brigade-oriented force. The Army modular force 2 initiative-a major transformational effort- involves redesign of the operational Army (Active, Reserve and National Guard). The redesign will migrate the Army to a larger, more powerful, more flexible, and more rapidly deployable force. At the same time, the redesign will move the Army from a division-centric structure to one built around a Brigade Combat Team. Brigade Combat Teams are a stand-alone, self-sufficient, and standardized tactical force of between 3,500 and 4,000 soldiers.

The Army has taken steps that address the changing requirements on the force structure and the effects of mobilization on units through the implementation of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN 3). The goal of ARFORGEN is to ensure Army units have sufficient resources to execute their training strategies as they move through the operational readiness cycle. For example, under ARFORGEN, how the Army equips the force will change dramatically. Before the change, units owned partial sets of equipment acquired through the MTOE, and equipment shortages were spread across the force. To attain proficiency under ARFORGEN, a unit's on-hand equipment must match its requirements, baseline, and training sets.

Conclusion

Transformational changes in the Army structure and warfighting policies have had an affect on the ability to provide weapons for the entire Army. Transformation affects many areas but none as critical as the soldier's last line of defense, his assigned weapon. Transformation to a modular force also has an affect on making sure small anus get to the warfighter. As missions change so have the requirements.

Acquiring the necessary small arms to provide resources for deploying force required that some nondeploying units transfer their weapons. The evolving requirements for small arms in support of the GWOT are challenging the Army in equipping its active and reserve component units. As a result, nondeployed units face a shortage of small arms and may not be able to adequately train and maintain acceptable levels of readiness for equipment and personnel. Although the Army mitigated some of the risks associated with the cross leveling of weapons at the tactical level, distribution of small arms creates unique challenges for commanders.

2 Modular force is the name for the Army's large-scale reorganization. The overarching goal of the reorganization is to convert the Army's combat brigades to units with designs that will be more capable of independent operations

3 ARFORGEN is a structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements.

5

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response

Deleted Recommendation. As a result of management comments, we deleted draft Recommendation A.1.

Management Comments. The Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization nonconcurred with the recommendation in our draft report. The Director stated that cross leveling weapons enables units to most effectively and efficiently meet developmental and changing operational demands in the theater and developing specific policy to govern cross leveling of weapons is not warranted, In addition, the Director stated that Army Force Generation and Army Training Strategy initiatives, along with Army Equipping Strategy set goals and establish processes for training and preparing ready and cohesive units for operational deployment. The Director stated the Army would adapt and refine its policies and procedures as needed to ensure unit readiness is maintained.

Audit Response. Although the Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization nonconcurred with our recommendation, the actions identified in the management comments comply with the intent of the recommendation. These actions include the implementation of Army Force Generation and the development of the Army Training Strategy. The Director stated, "These initiatives, in concert with the Army Equipping Strategy, set goals and establish processes for training and preparing ready and cohesive units for operational deployment. The ARFORGEN Implementation Plan, establishes policies for providing equipment, personnel, and resources throughout the Army. The Army believes these efforts will continue to evolve as implementation of ARFORGEN proceeds." The ARFORGEN Implementation Plan dated July 27, 2006, was not in effect until after the completion of the audit field work. The Army Training Strategy was not brought to our attention as we executed the audit. Therefore, based on the additional information the Army provided, we deleted draft Recommendation A.l. and revised paragraph 3 of Mission Requirements for Small Arms to include management efforts. No additional comments are required.

A.2. We recommend the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-8) forecast requirements for small arms and develop a plan of action that will close the gap on any future shortages.

Management Comments. The Deputy Director, Force Development did not concur or nonconcur. The Deputy Director stated that the Army continually updates the Small Arms Campaign Plan, which captures both current and future requirements for weapons. Additionally, the Deputy Director stated that the Army budget for FY 2008 through 2013 includes funding as well as funding requests for small arms programs.

Audit Response. Although the Deputy Director, Force Development did not specifically concur or nonconcur with the recommendation, the comments were responsive. The Deputy Director provided examples of how the Army has been responsive in efforts to forecast requirements for small arms and develop a plan of action that will close the gap on any future shortages. The Deputy Director stated, "The Army continually updates its Small Arms Campaign Plan. The first formal

6

presentation occurred in a January 2006 Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. The campaign plan captures both current requirements for weapons and future requirements. The Army budgeting process to support the FY08-13 timeframe includes funding and funding requests for small arms programs as briefed and approved during this AROC in accordance with available resources and Army G3 priorities." We were unaware of the AROC mentioned by the Deputy Director because the Council was not brought to our attention as we executed the audit. The purpose of the January 23, 2006 AROC was to review an introductory overview of the Army's Small Arms Strategy. After reviewing the January 23, 2006 AROC minutes and reviewing the Small Arms Strategy briefing, we concluded the Army is addressing small arms sustainment and modernization that should close future shortage gaps. Based on this additional information, we believe the response demonstrates senior military support for the Small Arms Campaign Plan. No additional comments are required.

7

B. Maintainability and Reliability of Small Arms

The Army generally had adequate controls for maintainability and reliability of small arms fielded to the warfighter. The Army accomplished this by proactively monitoring issues and risks as they arose. As a result of the Army's proactive approach to maintenance and reliability, the warfighter is provided with reliable small anus capabilities to sustain operations in varying environments.

Criteria

DoD Directive 4151.18, "Maintenance of Military Materiel," March 31, 2004, establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for the performance of DoD materiel maintenance, including maintenance of weapon systems. Army Regulation 750-1, "Maintenance of Supplies and Equipment, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy," 23 January 2006, establishes policies and responsibilities for maintenance of Army materiel.

Maintainability. Maintainability is the relative ease and economy of time and resources with which an item can be retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance personnel with certain skill levels perform. maintenance, using prescribed procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair. Maintainability is important to operations, or mission accomplishment, because it directly affects product availability. Reliability and maintainability are often considered complementary disciplines that are essential elements of mission capability.

Reliability. Reliability is the probability that an item can perform its intended function without failure for a specified time under stated conditions. Reliability is a measure of whether or not an item will function properly when used by typical users in its operating environment. For some systems that are repairable, the rate of recurrence of a problem is an important characteristic.

Controls for Maintainability and Reliability

The Army generally had adequate controls in place for maintainability and reliability of small arms fielded to the warfighter. Based on interviews with the selected units (see Appendix E) and commands within the Army's organizational structure, small arms maintenance was supported by dedicated and capable maintenance repair echelons.

Maintainability Controls. Of the 15 units reviewed, 13 had the necessary supplies for maintaining their weapons in theater. If the need of a soldier was not met at the unit level, the soldier could access the Small Arms Support Center in the theater of operation. If the required parts were not available, soldiers could substitute their weapon for a new or repaired weapon.

8

We obtained from representatives of the Small Arms Support Center in Balad, Iraq a listing of common maintenance issues, as of February 2006. As an example of a maintenance problem, personnel stated that soldiers used the wrong types of lubricants on the weapons. Instances occurred where the weapons were not cleaned thoroughly. Representatives also reported that not cleaning the weapons would affect performance. See Appendix F for the top 10 problems the Small Arms Support Center in Iraq identified pertaining to small arms.

At the unit level, a soldier called an Armorer is in charge of the Arms Room and provides the soldiers with maintenance support. The Armorer issues and receives weapons as well as schedules and performs preventative and organizational maintenance. When a soldier services the weapon and returns it to the Arms Room, the Armorer checks to see that the weapon functions properly. If a weapon has a mechanical problem, the Armorer tries to repair it. If unable to make the weapon serviceable, the Armorer schedules the appropriate level of maintenance on the weapon.

Project Manager Soldier Weapons established the Soldier Weapons Assessment Team-Iraq (SWAT) to assess performance of small arms during OIF. During June and July 2003, SWAT members interviewed the senior leadership of several units as well as soldiers (considered primary users) about the operational suitability, lethality, maintainability, and reliability of weapons. Although SWAT reported that minimal maintenance and reliability issues existed, some of the issues SWAT identified related to operations and maintenance. For example, the SWAT report cites the following issues.

• M249 gunners were dissatisfied with the complexity of the weapon because its numerous small parts encumbered field stripping and parts were easily lost. SWAT concluded that the M249 was the most problematic weapon in the theater.

• The M203 was most affected by the desert environment. Sand and dirt migrated into the trigger housing, clogging and jamming the safety.

Based on its findings, SWAT made several valuable recommendations. Representatives from PEO Soldier stated that organizations responsible for addressing the issues and risk areas either initiated or completed actions based on the SWAT recommendations. However as of August 2006, no formal documentation of those actions has been published, which is a potentially significant risk area senior managers must address. Additionally, to identify areas for improvement, the Directorate for Combat Development at the Army Infantry Center periodically conducts surveys of soldiers returning from combat. The SWAT assessment and surveys are tools the Army uses for collecting feedback from the warfighter.

Reliability Controls. Soldiers rely on their weapons to function properly. The Army accomplished this by proactively monitoring the maintainability and reliability issues and risks as they arose. To ensure the integrity of small arms in use, the Army monitors reliability through the following methods.

• Tracking replacement parts that are ordered

• Troubleshooting weapons using computer models

9

• Developing an Integrated Product Teams (IPT) to monitor weapons progress

Replacement Parts. PEO Soldier and the Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) track parts ordered for small arms, ARDEC officials stated that they, as well as PM Soldier Weapons, regularly review the most frequently ordered parts to determine if some way exists to make them last longer and obtain the parts at a lower cost. After studied, tested, and accepted, a part is introduced into the supply system and used as a replacement for worn parts.

Computer-assisted Tool. Computer models assist ARDEC in estimating the failure rates for weapon components. ARDEC officials stated that the results from computer models saved the Army months of routine live fire testing and hundreds of thousands of dollars. One of the examples they cited was an incident of M855 cartridges rapturing during the firing of the M249 machine gun. Because of the high speed and location of that rupturing event, the cause and time could not have been determined in live fire testing. ARDEC used computer models to determine the cause and develop preventative measures to reduce the instances in the future. PEO Soldier and ARDEC also have reports from users that the lug on the M249 machine gun was breaking frequently. Although redesigned, the Army needed to test the new model. ARDEC used a computer simulation to show the new design was seven times stronger then the previous model and the answer was provided in 3 days.

IPTs. When PEO Soldier introduces a weapon system, they assign an experienced IPT to follow a weapon system throughout its life cycle. A member chairs the IPT, but as the system ages and phases change, members of the team, change. For example, at the beginning of a weapon's development, testers (actual users) may be involved with performance of a weapon. Once performance issues are overcome, the weapons move to the sustainment phase. At that point, testers leave the group and sustainment experts join the IPT. Some of the experts in the sustainment period include engineers who will help identify and repair reliability problems. In addition, acquisition personnel help determine the best way to obtain sustainment parts and negotiate design modification.

Reporting reliability issues is an important part of oversight. Product Manager Individual Weapons and ARDEC monitor the following oversight processes for information about weapon degradation and failure.

• Quality Deficiency Reporting system, which is a feedback reporting system used to report quality deficiencies of an individual product.

• Logistics Assistance Representatives (LAR) review reliability issues. The LAR's assist the user at the unit level.

• IPTs are frequently called upon to review product reliability issues.

• Product Improvement Programs help increase product maintainability and reliability.

As a result of the Army's proactive approach to maintenance and reliability, the warfighter is generally resourced with reliable small arms capabilities to sustain operations in varying environments.

10

Conclusion

The Army generally had adequate controls in place that ensured maintainability and reliability of small arms fielded to the warfighter. Based on feedback from representatives of the Small Arms Support Center in Balad, Iraq (Appendix F), they feel additional small anus maintenance training for the warfighter should be considered.

The Army addresses reliability through a combination of established programs that provide feedback to senior management and by expanding its use of computer-assisted tools to simulate small arms problems. The increased use and reliance on computer models is attributed to the program's ability to quickly identify the source of the problem for a quick resolution at a significantly reduced cost. Benefits to using computer models include ease of identifying and resolving program issues, determining program status, and seeking opportunities for acquisition reform.

Recommendation and Management Comments

We recommend that Director, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) follow up on the findings and recommendations outlined in the Soldier Weapons Assessment Team Report No. 6-03 to ensure action has been taken to address each risk area identified.

Management Comments. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology concurred. The Assistant Secretary stated that team reports such as the Soldier Weapons Assessment Team Report are useful in identifying issues with equipment. The Assistant Secretary also stated that the Project Management teams investigate reported comments on team reports to determine whether issues can be resolved using material solutions or improved training procedures.

Audit Response. We consider the comments responsive.

11

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We performed the audit from June 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We evaluated the initiatives of the JSSAP to support and sustain the warfighter in the current operating environment. Specifically, we determined the availability of small arms for meeting requirements as well as whether adequate control measures were in place and ensured maintainability and reliability of fielded small arms.

DoD fields 33 types of small arms (see Appendix D). Because of the large universe of small arms fielded throughout DoD, we judgmentally selected six of the weapons-M9, M4, Ml6, M240, M249, and M203-to include in our review. We selected those six weapons because multiple Services use the weapons as well as support a variety of mission requirements (see Appendix C).

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) provided us with a list of Army units supporting OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom over a 2-year period-October 2003 through September 2005. During that time, 1,852 units deployed. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) identified a unit as a group of 20 or more personnel deployed at the same time under one Unit Identification Code. Because of the number of deployed units, time constraints, and lack of audit resources, we judgmentally selected 15 of the mobilized Army units (see Appendix E). We asked the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) to provide a list of the last five units mobilized from each Army Component-Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve-as of September 2005. We selected 15 units for our review.

Between January and March 2006, we interviewed personnel from 15 units. Of those 15 units, we visited 7 sites. At the other eight sites, we interviewed personnel by telephone and e-mail (see Appendix E). We prepared a list of 12 standard questions designed to assist us with assessing resource impacts about mobilization and potential issues with nondeploying units. We provided the list of questions to each of the 15 units before the interviews.

We reviewed the following memorandums. Army publications, DoD directives, and regulations to determine if the availability, maintainability, and reliability of small arms sufficiently supported the warfighter:

• Department of the Army Memorandum, "Designation of U.S. Army Tank- automotive and Armaments Command as Executive Agent for Wholesale Small-Arms Logistics," June 2, 1999; Department of the Army Memorandum, "Implementation of Unique Identification Policy," December 22, 2004

12

• Soldier Training Publication 9-45B12-SM-TG, "Small Arms/Artillery Repairer 45B Skill Level 1/ 2," March 25, 2001; Soldier Training Publication 10-92Y12-SM-TG, "MOS 92Y Skill Levels 1 and 2, Unit Supply Specialist," March 2003; Army Regulation 220-1, "Unit Status Reporting," June 10, 2003; Field Manual 4-30.3, "Maintenance Operations and Procedures," July 2004; and "Joint Service Small Arms Master Plan," November 18, 2003

• DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," September 2, 2001

• Army Regulation 71-32, "Force Development and Documentation- Consolidated Policies," March 3, 1997, which provides guidance for development and documentation of Army force personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations

We interviewed personnel from the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3); the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-8); TRADOC; the Army Infantry Center; PEO Soldier; the Project Manager Soldier Weapons; the Product Manager Individual Weapons; the Product Manager Crew Serve Weapons; Joint Service Small Arms Program; TACOM; and Small Arms Depot Overhaul Program to determine the scope and responsibilities of their programs as they relate to small arms.

To gain a better understanding of the scope of operations, the audit team also toured the Anniston Army Depot and received an overview of overhaul operations warehouse and the Defense Distribution Depot, Anniston small arms warehouse. We also reviewed the results of surveys the Army Infantry Center conducted of units returning from various theaters. The surveys address multiple areas of interest to the Combat Development Division.

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Use of Technical Assistance. We consulted with the Office of the Inspector General Quantitative Methods Division about developing a sample of units to conduct interviews. Because of the nature and complexities of some unit structures and missions, we determined a statistical sample would not be appropriate.

Government Accountability Office High-Risk Area. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the DoD Supply Chain Management and DoD Weapon System Acquisition Management high-risk areas.

13

Appendix B. Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, GAO, the Army Audit Agency (AAA), and the Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) have issued eight reports discussing small arms and the management of small anus. Unrestricted GAO, AAA, and AFAA reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov, https://www.aaa.army.mil, and https://www.afaa.hq.af.mil.

GAO

GAO Testimony No. GAO-06-170T, "Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined," October 20, 2005

GAO Report No. GAO-06-111, "Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives," October 4, 2005

GAO Report No. GAO-05-660, "An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages," July 12, 2005

GAO Testimony No. GAO-04-670T, "Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges," April 29, 2004

Army

AAA Report No. A-2004-0269-IMT, "Ammunition and Small Arms; California Army National Guard," April 30, 2004

Air Force

AFAA Report No. A-2004-0005-C06100, "Air National Guard Small Arms Management," May 20, 2002

AFAA Report No. F-2002-0001-C06100, "Air Force Reserve Small Arms Management," January 2, 2002

AFAA Report No. 99061003, "Small Arms Management," September 25, 2000

14

Appendix C. Weapon Systems

Table C-l. Small Arms Use by Service

Table C-2. Small Arms Specifications

15

Appendix D. U.S. Small Arms

Table D-l. U.S. Small Arms

Type	Nomenclature	Model	Placed in Service
Personal	Pistol	*9 mm M9	1986
	Subcompact Pistol	*9mm M11	1993
	Pistol	9 mm SIGP226	1987
	Pistol	.45 Cal MK23	1994
	Pistol	.45 Cal MEU (SOC)	1992
	Revolver	.357 MAG Smith and Wesson 686	1981
Individual	Rifle	*5.56mm M16 (Al - A4)	1963 -1999
	Carbine	*5.56 mm M4 (Al )	1994 -1997
	Rifle	7.62 mm M14	1957
	Grenade Launcher	40 mm M79	1960
	Grenade Launcher	*40 mm M203	1970
Crew Served	Squad Automatic Weapon	*5.56 mm M249	1984
	Squad Automatic Weapon	5.56 mm MK46	2001
	Medium Machine Gun	*7.62 mm M60 (D/E3)	1957 - 1985
	Medium Machine Gun	7.62 mm MK 43	1995
	Medium Machine Gun	*7.62 mm M240 (El/D/G/B/N)	1978-2002
	Medium Machine Gun	7.62 mm MK48	2003
	Medium Machine Gun	7.62 mm MK44/GAU16/M134	1965 - 1999
	Heavy Machine Gun	*Cal .50 M2	1933
	Heavy Machine Gun	Cal.50 XM218	1933
	Grenade Machine Gun	*40 mm MK19 MOD3	1983
	Grenade Machine Gun	40 mm MK47	2003
Mission Specific	Shotgun	12 ga Military Standard	1968 -1983
	Joint Combat Shotgun	*12 ga MI014	2000
	Sniper Weapon System	5.56 mm MK12	2002
	Sniper Weapon System	.300 Winchester MAG	1975
	Sniper Weapon System	*7.62 mm M40A1	1978
	Sniper Weapon System	*7.62 mm M24	1988
	Sniper Weapon System	7.62 mm MK11	2000
	Sniper Weapon System	Cal .50 M82A1 / A1A	1991
	Sniper Weapon System	Cal .50 M88 PIP	1997
	Sniper Weapon System	*Cal .50 M107	2003
	Close Quarters Combat	MP5K/N/SD3	1985

*Denotes weapons that will remain in active force through 2020.

mm - millimeter Cal - caliber ga - gauge

16

Appendix E. Army Organizations Reviewed

Table E-1. Army Organizations Reviewed

UIC	Location	State/ Country	Site Visit	Phone/E-mail
Active Component
WA07AA	Fort Sill	OK	X
WAB5AA	Fort Campbell	KY		X
WABNAA	Fort Bragg	NC		X
WANQAA	Fort Hood	TX		X
WFPDAA	Giessen General Depot	Germany		X
National Guard
WP7EAA	Pittsburg	CA	X
WPFRAA	Fort Gillem	GA	X
WPXOAA	Lincoln	NE	X
WV6EAA	Lexington	MO	X
WYKKAA	Fort Richardson	AK		X
U.S. Army Reserves
WQ02AA	Kenova	WV	X
WSCCAA	Flushing	NY		X
WSR8AA	Punxsutawney	PA		X
WVR1AA	Mesquite	TX		X
WZDMAA	Fraser	MI	X

17

Appendix F. Small Arms Support Center

The Small Arms Support Center at Camp Anaconda, Balad, Iraq provided their most common small arms maintenance problems. These issues were in response to a question the audit team had about the top 10 issue areas they address in theater. The following information is a direct e-mail response from the Small Arms Support Center at Camp Anaconda, Balad, Iraq and was not formally verified by the audit team.

1. Training. An issue that has arisen as soldiers are moved into different positions outside their normal Military Occupational Specialty or units falling on equipment they have not trained on. Example Field Artillery units picking up convoy security had never had an Up Armor High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle with an M2 .50 caliber.

2. Lubrication. Use of the correct approved lubricant or use of un-approved lubricants and not using sufficient amounts or used too sparingly.

3. M2 .50 Cal Machine Gun Headspace and Timing Gauge. Continues to be an ongoing problem with the Army. Some solders where not trained properly or did not have the gage.

4. Improper Functioning. Some local procedures conflict with Technical Manual as called out for how ammunition is loaded, chambered, charged, and safety not in accordance with the Technical Manual.

5. Re-assembling. Soldiers doing preventive maintenance checks and services breaking down the weapon to clean and put it back together improperly, loose springs, breach block put in backwards.

Assistant Secretary of the Army Acquisition Logistics and Technology Comments

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR ACQUISITION, ACQUISITION AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to the Draft of a Proposed Report on the Army Small Arms Program that Relates Availability, Maintainability, and Reliability of Small Arms Support for the Warfighter

Thank you for the subject report regarding the U.S. Army's Small Arms Program (Enclosure 1).

The report recommends that I follow-up on the findings and recommendations outlined in the Soldier Weapons Assessment Team Report Noumber 8-03 (Enclosure 2). to ensure action has been taken to address each risk area identified.

I concur with the draft recommendation. Team Reports like the one referenced in the Department of Defense Inspector General draft report, as well as continued sensing by the commanders and Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, are useful tools to identify issues with equipment that our Soldiers wear, carry, and employ. The Project Management teams investigate reported comments to determine whether identified issues can be resolved via materiel solutions (a new weapon, materiel, cover, etc.), or improved training or procedures (cleaning, maintenance, etc.). Occasionally issues identified to the reports are perceptions rather than actual deficiencies (e.g., poor projectile penetration or accuracy). As a result of the Global War on Terrorism, continued procurements of existing weapons may be necessary to replace weapons rendered unserviceable due to wear and tear at the same time the U.S. Army is seeking to identify and evaluate the weapon's capability or performance gaps. The M249 Machine Gun is a prime example of this situation.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report. I look forward to reading the final published report.

Claude M. Bolton, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)

Enclosures

21