Specifically, the references in the TACOM memo to "oil additives" are not germane to whether MILITEC-1 is or should be listed in the Army Master Data File. The issue at hand has nothing to do with "oil additives;" the issue is listing MILITEC-1 for weapons and machine shop applications.
MILITEC-1's lack of solvent is essential to its performance as a metal conditioner. A weapon first treated with MILITEC-1, then fired, does not need solvent to be cleaned (a patch moistened with MILITEC-1 will remove any debris from the treated weapon). Ironically, not only are soldiers convinced that CLP, the product qualified under the current weapons lubricants specification, is worthless, but its formula is under attack by OSHA for being hazardous to use, both in application and during firing of a CLP-treated weapon.
When Militec products received seven NSNs from DLA in 1993, the process was entirely proper, based on demonstrated, continued use of the products by federal agencies including, but not limited to, those of DOD.
In 1995, in response to an inquiry from 17 Members of Congress, DLA determined to establish NSNs for small sizes of MILITEC-1 that DLA would deliver to the military services for weapons and machine shop applications. The TACOM empioyee cited in the TACOM memo was himself consulted in August, 1995, by DLA officials during that process, which resulted in the attached DLA letter. DLA assigned the new NSNs carefully and deliberately, in full consultation with service representatives, including the TACOM employee. At that time, the TACOM employee advised DLA that he had no objections to that action, as weapons and machine shop lubricants were not within his purview, which is specifically engines and other mobility applications. DLA specified that the (then proposed) small sizes would be labeled and intended for weapons and machine shop applications, and the larger sizes would not be delivered to the military services.
Having agreed to what all parties - Congress, DLA, and Militec - considered a fair plan of action orchestrated by DLA, that TACOM employee then proceeded to sabotage an otherwise routine listing of active NSNs in the AMDF. This effectively precluded most field units from ordering MILITEC-1, since their supply personnel are accustomed to ordering through the AMDF, and are not aware that they can order directly through the FedLog. His action appears to be highly irregular; a high-ranking DLA official tells us he has never seen a case where a product was excluded from the AMDF when it had active NSNs and was being ordered by military units and by federal agencies.
